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Abstract 
 
Measuring the productivity of highway concessionaires is very relevant, especially when a price cap 
regulation is applied where tariff increases are based on expected improvements of productivity. Output 
may be measured in terms of traffic or network length, or a combination of both, while quality of service 
should ideally be accounted for. To measure productivity we consider only operating costs, as 
amortization and financial costs depend upon the original highway design and historical costs. A cross 
section analysis of the Italian concessionaires shows that: 1) operating costs depend on both traffic and 
capacity; 2) economies of scale are relevant but their estimate is very sensitive to the model specification; 
3) there are large differences in efficiency among operators, indicating that there could be significant 
room for yardstick competition.  
We subsequently consider the main economic data regarding the major Italian concessionaire 
(Autostrade spa) over two decades. Revenues increased greatly, even more than traffic, while operating 
costs remained substantially stable in real terms, as the automation of toll collection allowed the company 
to reduce the number of collectors by almost half. Finally, a comparison between Italian and French 
concessionaires shows that the latter have much lower operating costs, which cannot be entirely explained 
by economies of scale or lower personnel costs. 
 
Keywords: Highway; Regulation; Productivity; Price-cap. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this article, we examine the concept and measurement of the productivity of 
highway concessionaires. The topic has become of fundamental relevance considering 
the major privatizations of concessionaries which have occurred in some European 
countries (Autostrade in Italy, ASF, SANEF, and SAPRR in France).  
There are several reasons why the question of highway operators’ efficiency becomes 
more relevant in a private-oriented competitive framework. A first reason is yardstick 
competition. If the regulator wants to use incentives to improve the efficiency of 
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operators, he needs indicators to compare actual with optimal cost levels for each 
operator. A second reason regards the relative merits of private vis-à-vis public 
ownership. Indeed, one of the reasons for advocating privatizations is the supposed 
greater efficiency of the private sector, although empirical evidence on this point still 
needs to be consolidated. Comparing efficiency of private versus public operators is a 
key element for the determination of highway policy. In a recent contribution, 
Benfratello et alii (2005), using a panel data approach, shed some light on the cost 
structure of the highway sector in Italy. They estimate a cost function for 20 Italian 
concessionaires for the period 1992-2003. Their results indicate that private ownership 
has a positive impact on productivity while regulatory regime (Price cap versus Rate of 
Return) has no effect on productivity. 
Another reason to investigate highway operator efficiency is to determine the scope 
for scale economies and, thus, the most cost efficient market structure. Last but not 
least, the measurement of productivity changes is prerequisite for the implementation of 
price cap regulation. In Italy, for instance, tariff increases are determined as the sum of 
the change in the retail price index, minus the anticipated changes in productivity 
(usually referred to as the X factor), plus a quality premium based on accidents and road 
surface conditions (see Greco and Ragazzi, 2005, Benfratello and alii, 2006). Thus, in 
order to implement correctly the price cap regulation, regulatory authorities must have a 
clear understanding of the evolution of productivity both at the sector level and for each 
single operator. 
In order to shed light on the issue of highway operator efficiency several methods can 
be used. Highway efficiency can be analysed through comparisons among various 
operators within a single country or across countries. Cross-country comparisons may 
provide useful information on how different ownership structures or regulatory systems 
may affect cost efficiency. One may also analyse how the costs of single operators 
change over time, and how such changes relate to changes in the operating framework 
of the industry (mainly changes in the market structure and in technology). Other 
methods rely on the analysis of simple indicators (typically operating cost/vehicle.km). 
A more comprehensive method relies on the estimation of cost functions. Eventually, 
elaborating on costs functions, Stochastic Frontier Analysis models can be used in order 
to estimate the degree of (in)efficiency of various operators. 
In the present article, we make use of these various approaches in order to investigate 
highway operator efficiency. Section 1 is dedicated to the discussion of possible 
definitions of highway licensees’ output, showing the implications of each definition. In 
Section 2, we estimate a cost function for Italian concessionaires based on a cross 
section of 18 highway operators for year 2006 and provide estimates of marginal costs 
for traffic and network as well as a measurement of efficiency of each concessionaire. 
We estimate also a stochastic cost frontier where an additional single sided disturbance, 
representing inefficiency, is added to the traditional stochastic disturbance present in the 
cost function estimate. Such method allows the computation of inefficiency for each 
single operator, that can be used for yardstick competition. Section 3 analyses the 
evolution of costs and revenues of Italy’s major licensee over two decades. In Section 4, 
we compare Autostrade with three other main operators and we compare costs and 
revenues of Italian and French highway concessionaires. 
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2. How to define and measure productivity? 
 
Productivity is the ratio between output and inputs. In the case of networks, how one 
should define output is far from clear or generally accepted. There are basically two 
different approaches: the first refers to traffic (appropriately taking into consideration its 
composition), the second to the capacity that is offered by the infrastructure.  
If one considers output from the point of view of the (total) benefit obtained by the 
users, traffic would appear the best measure for output, although the quality of service 
should also be considered (safety, congestion, average speed etc.). If one considers 
instead the service provided by the operator, its output consists mainly in the provision 
of a certain capacity, which has a value (and costs) irrespective of the volume of traffic 
that goes through the infrastructure. 
Traffic depends upon the original design of the network and the subsequent evolution 
of demand; the company managing the network cannot significantly impact the volume 
of traffic. However, certain costs increase with traffic, depending upon the network. 
Unlike other network industries (the cost of maintaining an electric grid may be 
independent from the watt-hours that go through it), in the case of highways, 
incremental traffic may require additional services (and additional costs) both for toll 
collection1 and pavement repair. Traffic (especially HGVs) damages the pavement and 
thus causes additional costs. Damages may also derive from several other causes such 
as, for instance, climate (for a survey, see Bruzelius, 2004). It is therefore very difficult 
to measure the marginal cost of traffic regarding maintenance. Other costs, in particular 
collection, clearly vary in function of the traffic volume. However, traffic may not 
suffice to explain correctly operating costs. For instance, Link (2003), who considered 
operating costs (defined as "maintenance, operation and renewals") to be a function of 
traffic only, obtained models with relatively poor fitting2. 
Levinson and Gillen (1998) consider two components of highway production: "in 
general, highway segments produce two outputs: traffic flow which require capacity in 
terms of the number of lanes, and standard axle loadings which require durability in 
terms of thickness of the pavement" (Levinson and Gillen, 1998, p. 207). Further on in 
their article, Levinson and Gillen use a definition of highway production as the traffic of 
various vehicle categories. Benfratello and alii (2005) consider that the output is traffic, 
but the costs also depend on network length. Others, for instance the Italian NARS3, 
stress that measures of highway production expressed in terms solely of traffic provide 
misguiding evidence; according to them the indicators should refer to the costs of the 
network provided to road users, aside from the actual use that these users may decide to 
make. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Collection is a service provided by the licensee, but does not add to the utility of users, being a 
deadweight cost for society. 
2
 For a series of models estimated on data from Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden, the models' R² were 
ranging from 0,25 to 0,65. 
3
 The NARS (Nucleo consulenza Attuazione linee guida Regolazione Servizi di pubblica utilità) is a 
committee of experts in charge of advising the Ministry of Economics and Finance regarding the 
regulation of public services. 
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In conclusion, output may be defined as made up of three components: 
- provision of a given capacity, 
- throughput of the traffic, 
- quality of the service4 (pavement, safety, collection systems, congestion etc.) 
 
If data about the breakdown of operating costs for each of the three outputs were 
obtainable we could consider productivity separately for each of the three output 
components. Productivity in the provision of capacity could be estimated by comparing 
the network length with the operating costs dedicated to such purpose, and productivity 
in traffic handling could be estimated by comparing traffic volumes with costs related to 
toll collection and repairing pavement damage caused by traffic. It would be much more 
difficult to define a single index for quality. However, since a breakdown of operating 
costs is generally not available, in the following section we compare total operating 
costs to traffic and network size. 
 
 
3. Cost function estimate and measure of efficiency of Italian concessionaires 
 
In this section, we intend to measure the cost efficiency of Italian concessionaires. We 
first provide the results of a cost function estimation. We subsequently analyse how 
these results should be interpreted in terms of marginal costs. Eventually, we investigate 
the measure of inefficiency for the different operators. 
 
 
3.1 Cost function estimation 
 
We consider the concessionaires' production in terms of traffic and of road capacity. 
We do not consider the quality of service due to the limitations of the available quality 
index. Two types of models are used. The first estimates an average cost function and is 
based on the usual regression techniques. The second estimates a stochastic cost frontier 
where inefficiency is measured as (positive) deviation from this frontier. With regard to 
the measurement of inefficiency, we prefer to use the Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
rather than the class of methods based on Data Envelopment Analysis due to the 
deterministic nature of this last methodology. 
A common simplification, made for the assessment of infrastructure maintenance 
costs, is the hypothesis of constant marginal costs, even if the evidence is not clear-cut. 
One of the most frequently advocated advantage is the possibility to use non linear cost 
functions incorporating variable marginal costs. Although attractive, the intuition of 
variable marginal costs finds only limited support in the literature: as observed by Link 
                                                 
4
 In the regulatory framework in use in Italy, quality improvements are measured (and corresponding 
increases in tariffs are granted) on the basis of two indicators: accidents and quality of pavement. This 
method appears unsatisfactory. Accidents depend primarily on traffic regulations and are to a large extent 
outside the control of the licensee company. In recent years, accidents have diminished because of the 
stricter enforcement of speed controls and other similar measures taken at national level, and the decline 
in accidents has been similar on state roads as on highways. Operating costs for safety improvements are 
mostly those for road panels, presumably small enough to be disregarded without appreciable effects on 
the measures of productivity. 
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(2003), "in many cases the detected non-linearities were rather weak in the relevant 
range of traffic variables" (see also Ozbay et al., 2001, Deller and Nelson, 1991). 
Consistent with such findings, the simplification of relying on constant marginal costs 
has been accepted in current highway investment assessment practice as, for instance, in 
the Federal Highway Administration guidelines (FHWA, 1982) that considers "cost 
estimates of pavement wear as a fixed $/Equivalent Single Axle Load Mile". 
In our models, we consider a cost function where operating costs depend on two 
variables: capacity and traffic. The most visible challenge is to disentangle the intrinsic 
correlation among these two variables and isolate the effect of each variable. The 
dependent variable, operating cost, is defined as the sum of the following costs: 1) raw 
materials, and intermediate goods; 2) services; 3) rental and leasing; 4) personnel. Data 
are taken from the annual reports of the concessionaire companies. Amortization and 
financial costs are not considered as they mostly depend upon the historical costs of the 
infrastructure and the length of the concession. 
The independent variables are defined as follows: Capacity is expressed in weighted 
kilometres of highway (one kilometre of 3 lanes highway is supposed to be equivalent 
to 1.5 km of 2 lanes highway) and Traffic is expressed in terms of veh.km. This unit is 
preferred to other possible units: number of users, pcu.km (personal car units), t.km, 
ESAL.km (Equivalent Single Axle Load) or GVM.km (Gross Vehicle Mass.km) as it 
better fits with the purpose of our study. The number of transits would be useful to take 
into account the costs associated with toll collection but they would prove deceiving for 
other costs such as road maintenance. Pcu.km would rather be useful to understand 
traffic flow, ESAL.km or GVM.km would be apt for the estimating costs for pavement 
renewal but is not relevant for other expenses. Thus, considering that these various 
measurement units do not have advantages, we will stick to the measurement of traffic 
in terms of veh.km. We consider only the total flow of vehicles. We decided not to 
weight car traffic and HGV differently due to the relatively stable share of HGVs in 
total traffic among the different licensees. Note, as well, that due to the cross section 
nature of our data, the introduction of input prices in the cost function, that would be 
consistent with the micro foundation of the efficiency measures, would prove useless 
for our data: as input prices are invariant across our population the effect of these prices 
cannot be disentangled from the model's constant. We consider data for year 2006. We 
concentrate on one single year rather than using panel data. Panel data has already been 
implemented in previous works on highway concessionaires in Italy (Benfratello and 
alii (2005)) while we are not aware of any Stochastic Frontier Analysis based on cross 
section data. 
Table 1 provides the data as well as some relevant ratios (cost/km and cost/veh.km) 
for the investigated concessionaires. A well known feature of Italian highway sector is 
the strong dichotomy among highway operators: Autostrade per l'Italia (ASPI), without 
considering its subsidiaries, operates a network of 2,855 km and 48.2 billion veh.km, 
which is more than half of the total highway traffic; the other concessionaires are 
notably smaller (Autostrada del Brennero, the second largest operator, accounts for 
12 % of total highway traffic). Divergence from the mean is larger for concessionaires 
with a small network, see for instance RAV for cost/veh.km (11.8 eurocent per veh.km 
against an average of 3.6 eurocent) or Tangenziale di Napoli as well as Padova-Mestre 
for cost/km (1,845 and 771 thousand euro per km against an average of 504 thousand 
euro). This suggests the existence of non linearities together with possible 
heteroschedasticity that should be taken into account in the model estimation. 
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Table 1: Italian concessionaires, some descriptive data (2006) 
Operator Network Capacity Operating 
costs 
Traffic Op. costs 
per km 
Op. costs 
per veh.km 
 km Weighted 
km (2004) 
106 € 106 
veh.km 
103 €/km € cents/ 
veh.km 
Autostrade per l'Italia (ex Autostrade) 2,855 3,324 923 48,214 323 1.9 
Autovie Venete 189 182 64.7 2,629 342 2.5 
MilanoMare  184 235 89 3,091 484 2.9 
Padova - Mestre 41 54 31.6 1,148 771 2.8 
SAM. Autostrade Meridionali 52 55 36.9 1,562 710 2.4 
Torino - Savona 131 130 33.2 949 253 3.5 
Brescia - Padova 182 256 132 5,175 725 2.6 
Autostrada del Brennero 314 314 157.6 4,643 502 3.4 
Torino- Milano  130 189 61.9 2,150 476 2.9 
Torino- Piacenza 168 169 52.9 2,191 315 2.4 
ATIVA (Torino- Val d'Aosta) 156 150 54.5 2,190 349 2.5 
RAV (Raccordo Aut. Val d'Aosta). 27 27 10.4 88 385 11.8 
Centropadane 89 97 26.4 1,007 272 2.6 
SAV (Autostrade Valdostane) 68 60 21.6 405 318 5.3 
Autostrada dei Fiori 113 115 59.8 1,333 529 4.5 
SALT (Soc. Aut. Ligure Toscane) 155 154 61 2,070 394 2.9 
SAT (Soc. Autostrada Tirrenica) 37 36 10.1 248 273 4.1 
Autocamionale CISA 101 120 32.8 862 325 3.8 
Consorzio per le Autostrade Siciliane 268 217 n.a. 1,753 n.a. n.a. 
Strada dei parchi  281 285 57.9 2,296 206 2.5 
Tangenziale di Napoli 20 30 36.9 1,053 1,845 3.5 
Mean (unweighted)  265 295 101.5 4,050 504 3.6 
 
Based on these data, we estimate a set of costs function. We first estimate a linear 
model (a). Then we introduce a translog specification (model b), where all coefficients 
but log²(K) are present in the equation and have a significant coefficient. A simplified 
translog specification is also provided as model (c) on the grounds that it is more 
parsimonious than the previous model and is nearly as satisfactory considering the usual 
fitting criteria. Eventually, model (d) is the estimation of a stochastic cost frontier based 
on model (c). Model (d) includes two error terms: one is the traditional normally 
distributed disturbance, the other one is a single sided disturbance that represents the 
inefficiency of each operator compared with the stochastic cost frontier. A similar 
approach has also been tested for model (a) and (b). However, due to non convergence 
of the algorithms used for estimation (a situation that is not infrequent in the field of 
efficiency estimation), such models could not be calibrated. 
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The models are: 
 
 0 . .K Tco K Tβ β β ε= + + +        (a) 
 0 2( ) . ( ) . ²( ) . ( ) . ( ). ( )T T K TKLog co Log T Log T Log K Log T Log Kβ β β β β ε= + + + + +  (b) 
 0( ) . ( ) . ( ). ( )K TKLog co Log K Log T Log Kβ β β ε= + + +     (c) 
 0( ) . ( ) . ( ). ( )K TKLog co Log K Log T Log K uβ β β ε= + + + +      (d) 
 
where co  are operating costs (millions of euro), T is traffic (millions of veh.km), K is 
capacity (weighted kilometres) and ε  is independently (but not necessarily identically) 
normally distributed disturbance and u  follows a non-negative distribution. 
The estimates have been made after exclusion of the concessionaire ASPI, 
considering that this concessionaire is lying far outside the scatter of observations and 
would have a strong leverage effect on the estimated coefficients. The "Autostrada dei 
Parchi" has also been excluded because, for historic reasons, it has anomalous, very 
low, costs per kilometre. "Consorzio Autostrade Siciliane" is not included for lack of 
data. Consequently, the model is estimated based on 18 concessionaires. The 
estimations have been made using Limdep package, and they are presented in Table 2. 
This table features, for each model, an indicator of the quality of fitting (whether 
adjusted R², or Log likelihood, whenever relevant), together with the Root Mean Square 
Error (RMSE) of the estimated operating costs (which eases the comparison among 
models when the dependent variable is transformed5), the number of observations, as 
well as the estimated coefficients together with the critical probability associated with 
their t statistics. Note that the frontier model is estimated with the maximum likelihood 
method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 RMSE is not included for model (d), because it would not make sense to compare the forecast capability 
of a frontier model with other model. 
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Table 2: Estimate of costs function of highway concessionaires (2006 data) 
 
Model (a) Model (b) Model (c) Model (d) 
 
Linear Translog 1 Translog 2 Frontier (half normal) 
Dependent variable Costs Log (Costs) Log (Costs) Log (Costs) 
Fitting  adjR² 0.9305 adjR² 0.9458 adjR² 0.9367 LL 6.48 
         
Number of obs  18  18  18  18 
RMSE costs   9.39  7.15  8.53   
         
 Coeff. P. value Coeff. P. value Coeff. P. value Coeff. P. value 
Constant 1.169 0.80 2.849 0.00 3.036 0.00 2.883 0.00 
Capacity (K) 0.112 0.14       
Traffic (T) 0.021 0.00       
Log(K)   0.504 0.01 -0.901 0.00 -0.904 0.00 
Log(T)   -0.605 0.05     
Log²(T)   0.271 0.01     
Log(K)*Log(T)   -0.593 0.02 0.145 0.00 0.146 0.00 
Model (b) and (c) have been estimated using the White heteroschedasticity robust covariance method that corrects for 
heteroschedasticity of the error term.  
 
Model (a) estimates a constant marginal cost of traffic while capacity has limited 
explanatory value as its coefficient is not significant at the 10% probability level6. 
Results with translog specification are more satisfactory considering the significance of 
the coefficients as well as the fitting criteria RMSE. Model (b) provides the best fitting 
based on the RMSE criteria. Model (c), although slightly inferior to model (b) 
considering the fitting criteria of RMSE is presented for two reasons. First, it is more 
parsimonious. Second, model (c) can be used as a base for the estimation of frontier 
models, whilst estimation of the frontier does not converge when the specification of 
model (b) is used. This last observation is not univocally interpretable as it may be due 
both to the intrinsic limitations of the estimation tools and processes or to the 
inadequacy of the functional form. The choice between specification (c) and 
specification (b) is however not anecdotal as it provides different indications on the 
scale economies. As will be illustrated further, while marginal costs of the traffic is 
increasing in model (b), while it is decreasing in model (c). 
Model (d) estimates the stochastic frontier of the operators. The term representing 
inefficiency is distributed based on an half normal distribution distribution. Exponential 
and truncated normal have also been tested, but they were found to perform less well 
than the half normal distribution. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The critical probability associated with the constant is high. However we keep this constant in the model 
considering the undesirable properties of models without a constant. Note as well that similar estimates 
based on 2004 data also resulted in a non significant constant, although the critical probability was lower 
in magnitude (see Massiani and Ragazzi, 2006, for more details). 
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3.2 Marginal costs 
 
The understanding of marginal costs is not straightforward for models (b) and (c) as 
they produce a marginal cost that is function of traffic and/or capacity. To illustrate the 
economic meaning of equations (b) and (c), it is however possible to consider the 
marginal cost of traffic and capacity of given concessionaires. Table 3 indicates these 
marginal costs for three concessionaires that correspond to the quartiles of the 
concessionaires' population (based on increasing operating costs). For comparison 
purpose, the constant marginal costs of the linear model (model a) is also indicated in 
the right column. 
Table 3: marginal costs of traffic and capacity for three different concessionaires (2006 data) 
 Variable Marginal Cost ConstantMarginal Cost 
Model (b) Model (c) Model (a) 
Traffic Capacity Traffic Capacity Traffic Capacity 
Quartile 
(increasing 
operating 
costs) 
Concessionnaire 
€ cent/ 
veh.km 10
3
 €/km € cent/ 
veh.km 10
3
 €/km € cent/ 
veh.km 10
3
 €/km 
Q1 Autocam. CISA 0.9 231 2.4 20   
Q2 Torino Piacenza 1.5 222 2.1 79 2.1 112 
Q3 Autovie Venete 1.6 225 2.1 96   
 
The emerging pattern of the table is that, when using translog specifications, the 
estimates of the marginal costs are very sensitive to the specification of the model: 
while model (b) indicates sharply increasing marginal costs of the traffic and quite 
constant marginal costs of the capacity, model (c) indicates decreasing marginal costs of 
the traffic and sharply increasing marginal costs of the capacity. The marginal costs of 
the linear model, that are fixed by nature, have values that are within the minimum and 
maximum of the marginal costs of the translog models. 
Our findings suggest that, while attractive due to its high level of flexibility the 
translog specification exhibit a high sensitivity of the results to the functional 
specification. This may be in favour of a more modest, linear model whose limitation of 
providing constant marginal costs may be acceptable considering the limited range of 
variability in the dimension of the concessionaires under scrutiny. 
 
 
3.3 Inefficiency measures 
 
Based on model (d), we estimate for each concessionaire the inefficiency, that is 
E( u |u + ε ). The estimation is based on the method presented in Jondrow et al. (1982). 
The results are presented in Table 4. Two considerations should be made. First, the 
estimation of inefficiencies is contingent upon the choice of the distribution for the term 
u, but the relative inefficiencies are usually found to be highly correlated between 
different distribution assumptions. This is confirmed in our case, where the correlation 
between single inefficiencies estimated using the half normal distribution and the ones 
using exponential distribution is 0.98. This suggests that, while an absolute 
interpretation of inefficiencies is not robust, the relative magnitude of inefficiencies is 
informative about the efficiency of each concessionaire. Second, the measure of 
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inefficiency is contingent upon the specification of the cost function. This implies that a 
measure based on model (b) would provide different results. There is however 
considerable evidence that the impact of the specification of the cost function on the 
individual estimates is limited (cf. for instance the evidence collected, in other fields of 
applied economics, by Rosko and Mutter, 2007, p. 143). 
Table 4 indicates the inefficiency of each concessionaire. Based on these data, one 
could conclude that operators like Tangenziale di Napoli, Autostrada dei Fiori, as well 
as SAV, RAV and Autostrada del Brennero exhibit a higher level of inefficiency, while 
Torino-Piacenza, SAT and Centropadane, are among the most efficient. 
Table 4: Inefficiency measure for each concessionaire (model d) 7 
Autostrade Venete 1.08 ATIVA 1.09 
Milano Mare 1.12 RAV 1.19 
Venezia Padova 1.10 Centropadane 1.06 
SAM 1.09 SAV 1.20 
Torino - Savona 1.12 A. dei Fiori 1.34 
Brescia - Padova 1.10 SALT 1.13 
A. del Brennero 1.19 SAT 1.05 
Torino Milano 1.11 A. della Cisa 1.15 
Torino - Piacenza 1.07 Tangenziale di Napoli 1.22 
 
Our analysis suggests, however, that more effort should be dedicated to the analysis 
of the efficiency of highway operators to implement “yardstick competition”. 
 
 
3.4 Toll collection costs 
 
Eventually, one may want to consider how much these compared efficiencies may be 
affected by one single identifiable cost, that is the cost of toll collection. A rough 
estimate of the efficiency in toll collection may be obtained by comparing the personnel 
employed in collection with traffic volumes. 
                                                 
7
 The inefficiency measure is given as exp(E( u | u + ε )). Thus a figure of 1.20 indicates an inefficiency 
equal to 20%  of the minimum operating costs. 
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Table 5: Toll collection costs of concessionaires (2004) 
 
Toll collection 
staff 
Toll collection staff/ 
km 
Toll collection staff/ 
109 veh.km 
Autostrade per l'Italia 2,760 0.97 59 
Autovie Venete 267 1.48 118 
Milano Mare 454 2.48 153 
Autostrade del Brennero 398 1.27 88 
RAV (Raccordo Autostradale Val 
d'Aosta). 8 0.30 99 
Centropadane 72 0.81 80 
SALT (Società Autostrade Ligure 
Toscane) 194 1.26 97 
Autocamionale CISA 61 0.51 74 
Strada dei parchi S.p.A 293 1.04 133 
Tangenziale di Napoli 288 14.24 278 
Remark: only concessionaires whose information about employees categories was sufficiently detailed could be 
included in this table. 
 
As illustrated in Table 5, differences are very marked: Autostrade per l’Italia (ASPI), 
the major licensee, employed 59 collectors per billion vehicle.km, compared to 153 by 
"Milano-Mare" and 278 by “Tangenziale di Napoli”. However, such differences can not 
be simply attributed to different degrees of efficiency since they also depend on factors 
such as the length of the network, the number of gates and the average travelling 
distance of vehicles on each concessionaire's network. 
 
 
4. ASPI: a twenty years case study 
 
In this section, we investigate the historic evolution of the productivity of 
"Autostrade" which in 2003 changed its name to "Autostrade per l'Italia" (ASPI), 
excluding the subsidiaries that manage other highway sections as well as other 
subsidiaries which deal with activities that are not strictly related to highway operation8. 
Indeed, the group went through major organisational changes in 2003, while the activity 
of the company operating the highway has remained stable over time.  
We consider the years 1985 to 2005. Table 6 provides the following information: 1) 
Output is expressed in terms of network length (km of network) and in terms of traffic 
(millions of veh.km). The composition of traffic is not considered because it shows a 
stable pattern during the whole period9; 2) Revenues10; 3) Workforce (at year end) as 
                                                 
8
 For instance, from 1996 on, the consolidated accounts also include Pavimental, a company operating in 
road works that accounted for 7 % of the group turnover in 1997. Less important , but even more remote 
from highway operation, is the activity of Autostrade Telecomunicazioni created in 1996. 
9
 The maximum share of personal cars is 78 % in 1987, the minimum is 75,8 % in 2004. 
10
 For years 1985-1995, data are from R&S annual yearbooks (Mediobanca) and revenues are defined as 
total sales ("fatturato lordo"). For years 1996-2005 data are from the company’s financial reports and 
revenues are defined as the value of production ("valore della produzione"), i.e. Sales (“fatturato”) plus 
change in work in progress (“variazione dei lavori in corso”). 
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well as toll employees (collectors); 4) Operating costs11, indicating separately 
"personnel costs" and "goods and services" (total operating costs include also the value 
of stock variation which is not detailed in the table). Subsequently table 7 concentrates 
on the most relevant ratios (revenues per km and veh.km, costs per km and veh.km as 
well as personnel costs/employee). 
All euro data are homogenised at 2004 prices. The deflator is the production price 
index of industrial goods as provided in the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) 
yearbooks. To ensure homogeneity of data, the same deflator is also applied to deflate 
personnel costs. Revenues and operating costs at current prices are reported in the 
appendix (table 12). 
 
Table 6: descriptive data of Autostrade, 1985-2005 
Year Network Traffic Employees Revenues Operating costs 
   Toll 
employees 
Others Total  Goods and 
services 
Personnel 
costs 
Total 
 km 106 veh.km    (106 € 2004) 
1985 2,632 22,049 3,979 2,891 6,870 1,071 257 224 480 
1986 2,674 23,696 4,194 3,051 7,245 1,251 304 249 552 
1987 2,774 25,804 4,351 3,269 7,620 1,405 390 280 669 
1988 2,791 27,841 4,581 3,524 8,105 1,396 440 311 746 
1989 2,796 29,963 4,692 3,680 8,372 1,419 420 339 743 
1990 2,796 31,190 4,771 3,757 8,528 1,460 334 358 678 
1991 2,796 31,759 4,761 3,690 8,451 1,605 411 389 783 
1992 2,799 33,027 4,735 3,698 8,433 1,699 472 407 824 
1993 2,799 33,238 4,644 3,679 8,323 1,627 382 404 773 
1994 2,816 34,176 4,419 3,568 7,987 1,707 317 439 747 
1995 2,854 35,383 4,266 3,631 7,897 1,704 330 434 757 
1996 2,854 36,035 4,169 3,568 7,737 1,753 346 401 740 
1997 2,854 37,554 3,995 3,437 7,432 1,800 393 403 786 
1998 2,854 39,260 3,832 3,428 7,260 1,920 426 385 805 
1999 2,854 40,359 3,568 3,518 7,086 2,070 513 392 929 
2000 2,854 41,810 3,366 3,527 6,893 1,953 458 361 818 
2001 2,854 43,315 3,180 3,510 6,690 2,148 469 347 820 
2002 2,854 44,603 3,098 3,478 6,576 2,273 443 360 801 
2003 2,854 45,858 2,930 3,452 6,382 2,382 483 350 833 
2004 2,855 46,703 2,760 3,602 6,362 2,516 500 343 848 
2005 2,855 46,769 2,633 3,308 5,941 2,535 523 331 862 
 
                                                 
11
 Operating costs are the sum of personnel costs ("costi per il personale") plus purchases of goods and 
services ("acquisti e prestazioni di terzi, costi diversi di esercizio") minus the increase of work in progress 
("variazione lavori in corso”). For the years 1985-1995, data are from R&S annual yearbook 
(Mediobanca). For the years 1996-2005 data are from the company’s financial reports. 
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The length of the network increased very little up to 1995, and not at all thereafter12, 
while traffic more than doubled. Revenues (at constant 2004 prices) increased more 
than traffic as real tariffs (revenues per veh.km at constant prices) increased from 4.86 
eurocents per veh.km in 1985 to 5.42 eurocents in 2005. Real revenues per km 
increased from 407,000 euro in 1985 to 597,000 in 1995 and to 888,000 in 2005 (2004 
prices). 
Operating costs per km (table 7), although somewhat variable from year to year, after 
an initial increase to 267,000 euro (2004 prices) in 1988, remained relatively stable 
around this level for the following decade. After the privatization (with a peak in costs 
in 1999) operating costs per km increased from 287,000 euro in 2000 to 302,000 euro in 
2005 (2004 prices). We do not know if and to what extent the increase of costs for the 
purchase of goods and services after privatization was due to higher spending for road 
resurfacing. 
Operating costs per veh.km declined from 2.7 eurocents in 1988 to 2.0 eurocents in 
1996 and diminished only slightly thereafter (but for an exceptional peak in 1999). The 
decline of operating costs per km, in spite of the sharp increase in traffic, is essentially 
due to the increase of efficiency in collection. The introduction of automated collection 
systems, which started in the early ‘90s, made it possible to reduce the number of 
collectors (personnel employed in toll collection) from a peak of 4,735 in 1992 to just 
2,663 in 2005. This decline had already occurred, to a large extent, before privatization. 
Other employees declined somewhat from the early’90s to around 3,400 before 
privatisation and remained stable thereafter. Total personnel costs declined in real 
terms, in spite of the substantial increase of real average wages (see table 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 This holds even when one considers the number of lanes offered by the highway. Actually, if we take 
into consideration this element, the increase in capacity is only 10 % between 1987 and 2004. 
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Table 7: unit costs and revenues of ASPI (1985-2005) 
Year Revenues/km Revenues/veh.km Cost/km Cost/veh.km Personnel costs/ 
employee 
 103 € 2004/km € cent/veh.km 103 € 2004/km € 2004/veh.km 103 € 2004 
1985 406.9 4.9 182.4 2.18 32.6 
1986 467.7 5.3 206.6 2.33 34.4 
1987 506.5 5.4 241.3 2.59 36.7 
1988 500.0 5.0 267.4 2.68 38.4 
1989 507.4 4.7 265.6 2.48 40.5 
1990 522.3 4.7 242.3 2.17 42.0 
1991 574.0 5.1 280.1 2.47 46.0 
1992 607.1 5.1 294.2 2.49 48.2 
1993 581.1 4.9 276.0 2.32 48.6 
1994 606.0 5.0 265.3 2.19 55.0 
1995 597.0 4.8 265.1 2.14 54.9 
1996 614.4 4.9 259.2 2.05 51.9 
1997 630.5 4.8 275.2 2.09 54.3 
1998 672.7 4.9 282.1 2.05 53.0 
1999 725.4 5.1 325.5 2.30 55.3 
2000 684.2 4.7 286.7 1.96 52.4 
2001 752.5 5.0 287.2 1.89 51.9 
2002 796.4 5.1 280.8 1.80 54.7 
2003 834.6 5.2 291.9 1.82 54.8 
2004 881.4 5.4 297.0 1.82 53.9 
2005 888.0 5.4 301.8 1.84 55.8 
 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the main indicators13. We may 
summarize the main findings as follows: 1) there is no evidence of any gain in 
efficiency following privatization; 2) revenues per veh.km. increased by more than the 
price index (production prices of industrial goods), i.e. tariffs increased in real terms, 
from 1995 on; 3) this, and the sharp increase in traffic, caused an even larger increase of 
revenues while operating costs remained substantially stable; 4) there is no evidence 
that the increase of traffic appreciably increased operating costs; actually, the 
automation of collections allowed the company to sharply reduce the number of 
collectors. 
 
                                                 
13
 In the year 1999, when the company was privatized, there was an exceptionally high increase of both 
revenues and costs. The decrease from 1999 to 2000 is due to the fact that the production prices index 
increased by more than nominal revenues. 
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Figure 1 - costs and revenues of ASPI (1985-2004, million euro, 2004 prices) 
 
Amortization and provisions are another major component of total costs, in addition 
to operating costs and financial charges. Since the company invested very little from the 
early ‘90s on, over this period amortization and provisions remained substantially 
constant in monetary terms (see table 13 in the appendix) and declined in real terms, 
from over 60% of operating costs in the mid ‘90s to 40 % in 2004 (excluding goodwill 
amortization14). From 1995 to 2004, amortization plus operating costs declined by 4% 
to 1.18 billion euros (at 2004 prices) while revenues increased by 48% to 2.51 billion 
euros. 
 
 
5. Comparison among operators  
 
5.1 Comparing Autostrade with three other highway operators in Italy 
 
In this section, we compare ASPI with three other major concessionaires: Brescia-
Padova (BSPD), Autostrada del Brennero (BREN), Autostrada Torino-Milano (TOMI) 
excluding their subsidiaries. 
The data considered (table 8) are: network length (kilometres), traffic (light vehicles + 
heavy vehicles) expressed in millions of veh.km, operating costs (purchase of goods and 
services + personnel costs), total number of employees (and the number of toll 
collectors when available), revenues15. Operating costs and revenues are expressed in 
2004 euro using the production price index. Revenues include, in addition to highway 
tolls, other incomes, mainly sub-concession fees paid by restaurants and petrol stations.  
 
The network length of all four licensees remained unchanged; traffic increased by 30-
35%, with the exception of TOMI where traffic increased by only 17% perhaps due to 
                                                 
14
 From 2003 on, amortization more than doubled, but this was entirely due to the amortization of the 
“book” capital gain (“avviamento”) following the group reorganization. 
15
 Revenues are defined as "valore della produzione", ie. Sales (“fatturato”) plus change in work in 
progress (“variazione dei lavori in corso”). 
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works which reduced substantially the potential traffic flow. Comparing revenues to 
traffic we observe that the average toll (at constant prices) declined for BSPD, remained 
about unchanged for BREN and increased instead sharply for TOMI, whose revenues 
increased by twice as much as traffic. Also revenues of ASPI increased by much more 
than traffic, but this was due mostly to higher income from royalties and sub-
concessions while real tolls did not increase much. 
Operating costs per veh.km declined by 14-17%, except for TOMI (table 9). This was 
due mostly to the increasing use of automated collection systems which allowed a sharp 
cut in personnel employed in collection, particularly relevant in the case of ASPI. ASPI 
has the lowest operating costs per veh.km, almost half those of BREN.  
The very steep increase of real profits in this period is the consequence of revenues 
increasing by much more than operating costs, while capital costs (depreciation and 
financial costs) declined in real terms. 
Table 8: Comparison of Autostrade with three other concessionaires (1997-2006)16 
a - Network, costs and revenues 
Network Traffic Operating costs Revenues 
kilometres (106 veh.km) (106 € 2004) (106 € 2004)  
1997 2006 ∆  1997 2006 ∆  1997 2006 ∆  1997 2006 ∆  
ASPI 2,854 2,855 0% 37,554 48,214 28% 786 840 7% 1,800 2475 38% 
BSPD 183 183 0% 3,864 5,175 34% 106 120 13% 178 211 19% 
BREN 314 314 0% 3,437 4,643 35% 129 144 12% 191 249 30% 
TOMI 127 127 0% 1,838 2,150 17% 46 56 22% 88 120 36% 
 
b - Employees 
Employees 
Total Toll employees Other employees  
1997 2006 ∆  1997 2006 ∆  1997 2006 ∆  
ASPI 7,432 5,695 -23% 3,995 2,522 -37% 3,437 3,173 -8% 
BSPD 835 708 -15%       
BREN 864 946 9% 407 388 -5% 457 558 22% 
TOMI 457 459 0% 215     242     
 
                                                 
16
 Brennero Highway costs include the use of “renewal fund” (“fondo di rinnovo”). Operating costs of the 
Highway Brescia-Padova show large fluctuations over the years - around 100 millions euro from 1997 to 
2000, around 80 million euros from 2001 to 2003 and around 120 thereafter. This is due essentially to 
variations in the cost of external services (“costo per i servizi”). Data for the highway Torino-Milano are 
difficult to estimate, because the company was merged into SATAP (a company that operates the 
highway between Torino and Piacenza) in 2003. Moreover, revenues and operating costs are affected by 
the construction of a high speed rail track along the highway. Part of the construction operations have 
been undertaken by the highway operating company and reimbursed by the rail company. Costs and 
revenues of such activities have been estimated and excluded from the figures shown in the table, which 
thus refer only to activities pertaining to the highway 
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Table 9: Comparison of Autostrade with three other concessionaires, unit costs (1997-2006) 
Cost/network km Cost/106 veh.km Revenues/veh.km 
(106 € 2006) (€ cent 2006) (€ cent 2006)  
1997 2004 ∆  1997 2004 ∆  1997 2004 ∆  
ASPI 0.28 0.29 7% 2.09 1.74 -17% 4.79 5.13 7% 
BSPD 0.58 0.66 13% 2.74 2.32 -15% 4.61 4.08 -11% 
BREN 0.41 0.46 12% 3.75 3.10 -17% 5.56 5.36 -3% 
TOMI 0.36 0.44 22% 2.50 2.60 4% 4.79 5.58 17% 
 
Costs per million of veh.km for three operators declined markedly, mainly due to the 
automation of collection which allowed a sharp reduction in the number of collectors, 
especially by ASPI. ASPI has the lowest unit operating costs. Regarding cost per 
kilometre of highway, Brescia - Padova (BSPD) costs are more than double compared 
with those of ASPI, and they exhibit the sharpest increase over the period. The Brenner 
highway has the highest costs per veh.km, but it succeeded in reducing costs more than 
the others17. 
 
 
5.2 Comparison between Italian and French highway operators  
 
In this section we compare the operations of highway concessionaires in France with 
those in Italy. There are eight highway concessionaires in France, six of them are part of 
three groups, namely: ASF (Autoroutes du Sud de la France together with ESCOTA - 
autoroutes Esterel Côtes d’azur Alpes), SANEF (Société des Autoroutes du Nord et de 
l'Est de la France together with SAPN- Société des Autoroutes Paris Normandie) and 
APRR (Autoroutes Paris Rhin Rhône together with AERA). There is a rough 
geographical split of the highway network with ASF operating in the southern part of 
the country, SANEF in the area north and east of Paris and APRR in the Paris-Lyon 
corridor and in the Alps region. The two other concessionaires are Cofiroute (Paris-
Bordeaux Corridor with some extensions in south-west France) and Alis (which started 
operations in 2005 on a 125 km route in Normandy). 
 
                                                 
17
 In its bookkeeping, Brennero highway makes use of a special fund called renewal fund. In the 
computation of costs, we take into account the use of this fund. This however makes the computation of 
costs subject to more uncertainty as it gives the company some discretionality in the use of the fund. 
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Table 10: Descriptive data of highway concessionaires in France (2005 data) 
Operating costs 
Network size Traffic Staff Revenues Purchase of 
goods and 
services 
Personnel 
costs 
Total Group Operator 
km veh.km units 106 € (2005)  
SANEF Group  1,742 14,200 N. A. 1,152 108 142 249 
incl. SANEF 1,374 11,048 2,380 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
incl. SAPN 368 3,198 728 265 39 32 71 
ASF Group  3,422 32,603 7,975 2,474 218 336 554 
incl. ASF. 2,963 26,332 5,665 1,958 158 258 416 
incl. ESCOTA 459 6,271 1,828 516 60 78 138 
APRR Group  2,205 19,989 4,391 1,571 155 190 345 
incl. APRR 1,810 15,896 3,236 1,210 111 146 257 
incl. AREA * 384 4,047 1,143 361 44 44 88 
Cofiroute  928 9,041 1,919 889 91 89 180 
Note: AREA data are for year 2003. 
 
Revenues of French operators (Table 10) are almost entirely from tolls, with only a 
few million coming from sub-concessions, which represent instead a sizeable portion of 
revenues of Italian operators. 
Table 11: Operating ratios of French highway concessionaires and comparison with Italian concessionaires (2005 
data, current prices, unless specified) 
Traffic 
intensity 
Operating 
costs/ 
network km 
Operating 
costs/ veh.km 
Revenues**/ 
network km 
Revenues**/ 
veh.km Group Operator 
106 veh.km/ 
km 10
3
 €/km € cent/ 
veh.km 10
3
 €/km € cent/ 
veh.km 
SANEF Group  8.2 143 1.8 661 8.1 
incl. SANEF 8.0 N. A. N. A. N. A. N. A. 
incl. SAPN 8.7 193 2.2 719 8.3 
ASF Group  9.5 162 1.7 723 7.6 
incl. ASF. 8.9 140 1.6 661 7.4 
incl. ESCOTA 13.7 301 2.2 1,124 8.2 
APRR Group  9.1 156 1.7 712 7.9 
incl. APRR 8.8 142 1.6 669 7.6 
incl. AREA * 10.5 229 2.2 940 8.9 
Cofiroute  9.7 194 2.0 958 9.8 
Weighted Average France 
(2005)  9.1 160 1.8 734 8.0 
ASPI (2005)  16.4 314 1.9 924 5.6 
Weighted Average Italy 
(without ASPI) ( 2004)  13.2 379 3.1 710 6.2 
* AREA data are for year 2003. 
** Revenues are defined as: turnover (“chiffres d’affaires”) for French concessionaires, net toll revenues (“ricavi 
netti da pedaggio”) for Italian concessionaires, except for ASPI where it refers to toll and concession revenues. 
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Traffic intensity in France is well below that of Italy (Table 11). In spite of this, the 
operating costs per veh.km of Italian concessionaires are more than 50% higher than 
those of the French concessionaires, and their operating costs per km are more than 
double. This difference is partially due to the fact that average personnel costs are 16% 
higher in Italy (the average annual cost per employee is around 44,000 euro for French 
concessionaires (2005) and around 51,000 euro in Italy (2004)). Another reason may be 
the very large difference in the size of the operators in France and in Italy. Although 
scale economies did not clearly emerge from the analysis of 18 Italian operators, we are 
unable to exclude the relevance of scale economies for large size differences; this is 
consistent with the observation that ASPI has much lower operating costs than all the 
other smaller concessionaires in Italy. Differences in operating costs in the two 
countries are however strikingly large and this would certainly deserve further 
investigation. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Measuring the productivity of highway concessionaires is very relevant, especially if 
a price cap regulation is applied. Productivity of highway concessionaires is generally 
defined as the ratio of traffic to costs. However, the volume of traffic is outside the 
control of the operating company, depending mostly upon the original design of the 
infrastructure and the growth of the economy. The output of a company operating an 
existing infrastructure may best be measured in terms of the provision of a given 
capacity plus incremental services for traffic, including quality of service. To measure 
productivity one should consider only operating costs, since amortization and financial 
costs depend upon historical investment costs and length of the concession. 
A cross section analysis of 18 Italian concessionaires shows that:1) operating costs 
depend on both traffic and capacity (size of the network); 2) economies of scale may be 
relevant, but they do not emerge clearly on the basis of our estimations. Translog 
specifications, that would be suitable for the description of scale economies, provide 
sharply different estimates of scale economies for models with slightly comparable 
fitting; 3) based on Stochastic Frontier Analysis, we find large differences in cost 
efficiency among operators, suggesting that there is room for yardstick competition. 
Data over two decades for the major Italian concessionaire indicate that: 1) the 
volume of traffic doubled and tariffs were also increased in real terms, thus revenues per 
network km (at constant prices) more than doubled, reaching 3 times operating costs; 2) 
the increase of traffic did not noticeably increase operating costs (at constant prices), as 
the automation of collections allowed the company to sharply reduce the number of 
collectors; 3) there is no evidence of significant gains in efficiency following 
privatization. 
The analysis of three other main italian concessionaires, over the period 1997-2004, 
confirms that the increase in traffic did not result in comparable increases in operating 
costs, while there are large differences in cost efficiency among operators. 
Finally, a comparison between Italian and French concessionaires shows that the latter 
have much lower operating costs, which cannot be entirely explained by economies of 
scale or lower personnel costs. 
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On the whole, the evidence that is collected in this article casts doubt on the validity 
of the competitive framework prevailing in the highway industry in Italy. There is no 
evidence that the privatisation of Autostrade improved efficiency, costs in the industry 
are much higher than in France, revenues have increased more than costs leading to the 
creation of large rents that regulation should have avoided. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 12: ASPI - Revenues18 and operating costs at current prices 
Revenues Total Operating costs Income/veh.km 
 
106 € (current prices) 106 € (current prices) € cent/km (current prices) 
1985 639 286 2.9 
1986 747 330 3.2 
1987 803 412 3.1 
1988 889 476 3.2 
1989 958 501 3.2 
1990 1,026 476 3.3 
1991 1,165 569 3.7 
1992 1,258 610 3.8 
1993 1,248 593 3.8 
1994 1,359 595 4.0 
1995 1,463 650 4.1 
1996 1,535 647 4.3 
1997 1,595 696 4.2 
1998 1,704 714 4.3 
1999 1,833 822 4.5 
2000 1,833 768 4.4 
2001 2,055 784 4.7 
2002 2,179 768 4.9 
2003 2,319 811 5.1 
2004 2,516 843 5.4 
2005 2,637 896 5.6 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Revenues refer to gross turnover ("Fatturato Lordo") for years 1985-95 and production value (Valore 
della produzione)  from 1996 on.  
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Table 13: ASPI - Allowances for maintenance and amortization funds 
Amortization 
Amortization 
of goodwill 
Deferred 
charges 
Financial Industrial Total 
Provisions for 
maintenance 
fund 
Total 
(amortization + 
provisions) 
Year 
106 € 2004 
106 € 
(current 
prices) 
1985  1 150 152 303 
 
303 181 
1986 
 
1 194 187 382 
 
382 228 
1987 
 
3 125 219 347 
 
347 213 
1988 
 
4 155 213 372 
 
372 237 
1989 
 
6 172 205 383 
 
383 259 
1990 
 
7 179 220 407 
 
407 286 
1991 
 
10 197 214 421 
 
421 305 
1992 
 
11 212 214 436 
 
436 323 
1993 
 
10 228 207 445 
 
445 341 
1994 
 
9 248 197 455 
 
455 362 
1995 
 
8 283 182 474 
 
474 407 
1996 
 
7 268 53 328 76 404 354 
1997 
 
7 140 58 206 196 401 356 
1998 
 
7 141 54 202 247 450 399 
1999 
 
8 144 57 209 194 403 357 
2000 
 
10 137 65 212 101 313 294 
2001 
 
11 135 68 214 144 358 343 
2002 
 
13 139 76 227 124 352 337 
2003 448 28 107 52 635 144 779 759 
2004 436 34 108 45 624 151 775 775 
Source: R&S yearbook until 2000. Annual Reports from 2001 on. 
